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Abstract  
This article reviews the challenges and opportunities confronting the European 
Union in its trade and broader commercial policies, in what is a period of transition. The 
article begins by evaluating the foundations of the EU’s ‘actorness’ in trade policy, and in 
particular by identifying three underlying logics of EU policy development: the ‘internal’ 
logic, the ‘external’ logic and the ‘identity’ logic.  The interaction between these logics is 
seen as driving the ways in which the EU enters into global trade relationships, and as 
accounting for tensions and contradictions in a number of areas. Subsequent sections of the 
article deal with the images presented by the EU in trade policy, with the EU’s changing 
position in world trade, with the current trade agenda and the new agenda of broader 
commercial policy. The article finishes with a review of potential future issues in EU trade 
and commercial policies, and with a reassessment of the ‘three logics’ and their 
interaction. 
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KÜRESEL TİCARET AKTÖRÜ OLARAK AVRUPA BİRLİĞİ:                       
ZORLUKLAR VE FIRSATLAR 
Özet 
Bu makale Avrupa Birliği’nin, geçiş dönemi olarak nitelendirilebilecek bir 
dönemde, ticaret politikaları açısından karşı karşıya kaldığı zorlukları ve fırsatları 
incelemektedir. Makale öncelikle AB’nin ticaret politikası bağlamındaki “aktörlüğünün” 
temellerini değerlendirecek ve özelikle AB’de politika gelişimini etkileyen üç mantık olan 
‘iç” mantık, ‘dış’ mantık ve ‘kimlik’ mantığını ortaya koymaya çalışacaktır. Bu mantıklar 
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arasındaki etkileşim, AB’nin küresel ticaret ilişkilerine girme biçimlerini yönlendirme ve 
çeşitli alanlardaki tansiyon ve çelişkiler için hesap verebilirlik olarak görülmektedir. 
Makalenin ilerleyen bölümleri AB’nin dünya ticaretinde değişen konumu, mevcut ticaret 
gündemi ve daha kapsamlı ticari politika için oluşturduğu yeni gündem ile birlikte AB’ nin 
ticaret politikasında sergilediği imajla ilgilenmektedir. Makale, AB ticaret politikasının 
gelecekteki olası konularını, üç mantığın yeniden değerlendirilmesi ve bunların birbiri ile 
etkileşimini gözden geçirerek sonlanmaktadır. 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Avrupa Birliği, Ticaret Politikası, Küresel Ticaret 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The trade policies of the European Union (EU) are in a period of transition. 
At one level, the changes introduced in the Lisbon Treaty have given the EU a 
more comprehensive trade policy framework than it has ever had before. At the 
same time, the impact of the global financial and economic crisis has created a new 
set of external challenges and opportunities for the EU, the outlines of which are 
often only dimly discernible. This is accompanied by the structural shifts in the 
global arena that have generated a new constellation of global economic and 
commercial power, typified especially by the emergence of the ‘BRIC’ countries 
(Brazil, Russia, India and China) and by the challenges they pose to existing 
institutional and policy frameworks. Such shifts, when combined with the changes 
in the EU policy framework and the broader global economic atmosphere, raise 
important questions about how and with what effect the EU may be able to exploit 
new opportunities or resist threats to its leading role in global trade policy. 
This article sets out to place current challenges and opportunities into a 
broader context, and to suggest ways in which the institutions, ideas and policies 
characterising EU trade policy might be evaluated. The aim is to identify the 
components of EU policies, to explore the forces that drive them, and to use this as 
a basis for evaluating current policy challenges and opportunities as well as the 
EU’s actual and potential responses to them. The article begins by evaluating the 
foundations of the EU’s ‘actorness’ in trade policy, and in particular by identifying 
three underlying logics of EU policy development: the ‘internal’ logic, the 
‘external’ logic and the ‘identity’ logic.  The interaction between these logics is 
seen as driving the ways in which the EU enters into global trade relationships, and 
as accounting for tensions and contradictions in a number of areas. Subsequent 
sections of the article deal with the images presented by the EU in trade policy, 
with the EU’s changing position in world trade, with the current trade agenda and 
the new agenda of broader commercial policy. The article finishes with a review of 
potential future issues in EU trade and commercial policies, and with a 
reassessment of the ‘three logics’ and their interaction. 
 
FOUNDATIONS OF EU ‘ACTORNESS’ IN TRADE POLICY 
There is no dispute that the EU constitutes a leading trade power in the 
global arena. Indeed, the EU can be seen as the world’s champion trader, not only 
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in goods but also in services, where EU companies have a position comparable to 
those of American corporations. Both the sheer quantity of EU trade and exchange, 
and the size and relative openness of the EU’s single market, give the Union a key 
position in the structures and processes of world trade and commercial transactions 
more generally (Meunier and Nicolaidis 2005; Smith 2004). So the first essential 
component of the EU’s position in global trade is what might be described as 
‘weight’: the Union is inevitably one of the big players in the global arena because 
of the size of its presence and the effects this creates, not only structurally but also 
in the behaviour of other leading trade and commercial actors. 
Alongside this essential foundation of the EU as a ‘trade power’ goes a 
number of other major forces and factors that give the EU the capacity to use its 
weight and to direct its resources. The first of these is a powerful institutional 
framework, which confers upon the Union a number of important ‘state powers’ in 
the field of trade policy. Since the Treaty of Rome in 1957, which established the 
Common Commercial Policy and linked it to the development of the world trading 
system, there has been a process of continuous (but not always smooth or even) 
development of the institutional framework, which has gradually extended the 
reach of EU trade policy and which has responded to the changing character of 
world trade itself. Thus during the 1980s and 1990s, there were major changes 
reflecting the internal development of the European Single Market, and these often 
went alongside changes in world trade – for example, the growing role of trade in 
services, or the problems relating to intellectual property rights. The EC and then 
the EU also developed a series of important related policies, such as those on 
development assistance or on competition policy, which came increasingly into 
play as the scope and comprehensiveness of EU trade and commercial policies 
increased. During the late 1990s and early 2000s, these institutional developments 
increasingly came together, as reflected in the Amsterdam and Nice Treaties and 
then finally in the Lisbon Treaty. The latter in many ways completed the job of 
integrating EU trade and commercial policies, resolving a number of residual 
issues about the relationship between Member States and the EU institutions and 
reducing the number of areas in which ‘mixed methods’ of policy-making still 
prevail (Meunier and Nicolaidis 2005; 2010 forthcoming). 
This is not to argue that everything in the EU’s trade and commercial 
policy framework is uncontentious and smoothly functioning. The EU has a policy 
framework in which there are several important concentrations of power and where 
there is always the potential for conflict between ‘principals in the Council of 
Ministers). and their ‘agents’ in the Commission (Kerremans, 2006) Rather like the 
situation in the USA, there is a division of powers which is often challenged by the 
demands of day-to-day policy-making and implementation. Given the changing 
nature of world trade and the global economy, it is to be expected that EU trade 
policies will be open to challenge and to modification by events. It is also clear that 
the capacity of the EU to extract resources from the Member States and to use them 
in its external policy-making is still subject to important qualifications. Whilst 
these are not as severe as (for example) in foreign, security and defence policy, it is 
still not to be taken for granted that the Union will always prevail over its Member 
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States when it comes to challenging areas of trade policy. As Alasdair Young has 
pointed out, there is still a question mark over the EU’s capacity to ‘punch its 
weight’ in trade and commercial policy (Young, 2006). 
Nonetheless, it is clear that the Union can add to its global economic 
‘weight’ and its institutional capacity the capacity to mobilise resources in the 
arena of global trade policy. One important area in which this is evident is the EU’s 
involvement in a wide range of trade and trade-related policy institutions, headed 
by the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and including a host of lesser bodies. The 
legitimacy of EU trade and commercial policy is bolstered by the Union’s 
increasing presence in these bodies, although there are still uncertainties in some 
cases about exactly who is to represent the EU and what that representation means. 
Americans have frequently pointed out that in many international bodies, the EU 
has many more votes than the USA, and that this position should be regularised. It 
has also been apparent that the ways in which the Commission represents EU 
interests in the WTO and elsewhere can cause friction with the perceived interests 
of Member States, and that this can create a problem of legitimacy within the 
Union itself when these interests clash and are not reconciled (Kerremans, 2006). 
Consequently, when exploring EU trade and commercial policies, we need 
to take account of a range of driving forces and dynamics. One way of doing this is 
to think in terms of the logics of EU trade and commercial policy-making. To put it 
simply, I would argue that in EU external policy-making in general it is possible to 
identify three driving logics1. The first of these is the ‘internal’ logic of the 
integration process within the EU, through which external policy-making can be 
seen as a reflection of the progress made in the integration project as a whole. At 
the same time, it is also possible to see external policy-making as contributing to 
the integration process, by providing evidence of the Union’s capacity to have an 
influence in the world and thus by bolstering the legitimacy of the EU as a whole. 
In terms of trade and commercial policy, it would be difficult if not impossible to 
assess the effectiveness of external policy without taking into account the progress 
or the problems of internal EU integration; and the growing impact of EU trade and 
commercial policy in the outside world also contributes to the consolidation of 
such policy as a contribution to the EU’s internal progress. 
The second logic I want to explore is the ‘external’ logic – or to put it more 
precisely, the logic of the external opportunity structure in which the EU is 
implanted. It is apparent that some types or phases of international economic and 
political development give the EU more ‘space’ to operate and assert itself than do 
others. At some times and in some areas, the external opportunity structure is open 
to the EU, and facilitates the development of an assertive EU role; at others, the 
opportunity structure is closed to the EU and the space for self-assertion is reduced. 
Thus, for example, periods in which world trade is expanding and in which 
international organisations are able to expand their governance functions are likely 
                                               
1 These ideas are developed with a different empirical focus in Smith (2009) and Smith and 
Xie (2009b). For related ideas, see Bretherton and Vogler (2006) and Ginsberg (1989). 
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to be good for the EU; if on the other hand world trade is threatened or contracting, 
and multilateral governance is problematic, that might well limit the EU’s potential 
impact. 
The third and final logic I want to explore here is the ‘identity’ logic. Much 
of the EU’s international policy-making can be interpreted as a sustained attempt to 
create and strengthen a certain type of ‘European identity’, characterised by 
‘civilian’ or ‘normative’ power and centred in principles such as ‘effective 
multilateralism’ in the management of international processes and problems. As a 
result, there is a consistent concern in EU external policy not only with material 
interests and material gains or losses, but also with the image of the EU that is 
being projected at any time and in any area of policy. This means that trade and 
commercial policy need to be interpreted at least partly in terms of the ways in 
which they serve this ‘idea of Europe’; and it also means that there are likely to be 
significant internal contradictions in this area because of the collision between 
material interests and the ‘idea of Europe’.  
These three logics of EU policy-making do not, of course, exist 
independent of each other. They interact, and they can come into conflict. Where 
all three logics are ‘positive’, then it could be argued that there is a great deal of 
potential for the development of EU policies; where all three are negative, there is 
little such potential. Most frequently, the signs are mixed, with one or two of the 
logics positive and one or two of them negative. It is part of the skill of policy-
making in the EU to recognise the ways in which these logics are aligned, and to 
adjust policy accordingly either to maximise advantage or to reduce the damage. In 
trade and commercial policy, the stakes are high, with the potential for major 
advances or losses in a wide range of issue areas, and with major competitors ready 
to seize upon the contradictions of EU policy-making. There is also the potential 
for a major ‘image problem’ for the EU, and this is my next subject. 
 
IMAGES OF THE EU IN TRADE POLICY 
How does the EU deploy its resources in trade and commercial policy, and 
how does the Union appear to those upon whom its policies will have significant 
effects? In this section, I suggest that the EU’s image in trade and commercial 
policy is subject to a series of contradictions, which reflect in part the interaction of 
the ‘three logics’ dealt with in the previous section. These contradictions are not 
just theoretical; rather, they have profound implications for the conduct of EU trade 
and commercial policies. They can be expressed as a series of three key focuses. 
The first focus centres on the openness of EU trade and commercial 
policies. On the one hand, there have been frequent fears that the EU will form the 
nucleus of a ‘fortress Europe’ – and many of the EU’s trade partners have reason to 
believe that this is a strong element in the EU’s policy make-up. There is a 
considerable element of unilateralism in the operation of key EU programmes such 
as those focused on anti-dumping and on the Generalised System of Preferences, 
and to the outsider this can appear very much as the operation of a ‘fortress 
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Europe’ policy. The EU would of course deny this, and the more wide-ranging 
fears of ‘fortress Europe’ that were expressed in the early 1990s as the Single 
Market Programme was implemented have proved to be unjustified; but there is 
evidence that the operation of the EU’s institutions is less open and responsive than 
many of the Union’s partners would wish. At the other end of the spectrum is the 
image of the EU as ‘world partner’, which has been much cultivated by the 
Europeans, and which presents the EU as the centre of a wide-ranging network of 
international agreements. This is the logical extension of the idea that the EU is a 
key practitioner of multilateralism – the Union is the expression in the global 
economy of the desire to extend governance and to create global rules. There are 
some tensions in this image, though – not least the fact that through the extension 
of partnerships in the global arena, the EU has created a ‘pyramid of privilege’ in 
which it can manage its relations with a wide range of international partners, not 
necessarily to the benefit of global governance as a whole (see below) (Meunier 
and Nicolaidis 2005; 2010 forthcoming). 
The second focus has to do with the relationship between the EU and 
globalisation or regionalisation. It is well established that these two processes co-
exist in the global political economy of the twenty-first century, and that they can 
come into collision. The EU provides one of the most concentrated examples of the 
ways in which this collision can set up tensions and policy dilemmas. On the one 
hand, the Union has an ambivalent relationship with globalisation: it can be argued 
that the EU is one of the ways in which the forces of globalisation are channelled 
into Europe as a whole (and incidentally, that the EU can be seen as a repository of 
neo-Liberal economic practices). In this respect, the EU is an agent of 
globalisation, and has the effect of magnifying its impact. But at the same time, the 
Union can be seen as a strongpoint of resistance to globalisation – a set of 
institutions and rules that can be used to mitigate the impact and the insecurities 
created by the evolution of the global economy. Increasingly, it is evident that the 
EU is at the very least a powerful channel for the management of globalisation 
(Jacoby and Meunier, 2010). At the other end of the spectrum, the EU can be seen 
as the basis for an exceptionally strong form of regionalisation – and this of course 
links with the idea that it can be a source of protection against globalisation. In this 
image, the EU becomes not a ‘building block’ of the global economy, but a 
‘stumbling block’ to the onward march of globalisation, because of the priority 
given to its internal integration processes and to the incorporation of new Member 
States at the expense of more global objectives. 
The third focus concerns the ways in which the EU contributes to the 
creation of order in the global political economy. On the one hand, the EU has 
often presented itself as a ‘bridge-builder’, creating new forms of inter-regional and 
other partnerships in the world arena (Hardacre, 2010). Thus, there are many 
examples of the kind of inter-continental relationships and ‘strategic partnerships’ 
that can be seen as contributing to the creation of a new world economic order (the 
ASEM process with Asia-Pacific countries, the relationships with the African 
Union and the Rio Group in Africa and Latin America) – and it is clear that the 
creation of these partnerships is a central part of the narrative of EU trade policies. 
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But at the same time, there are suspicions that at least some of these partnerships 
are part of a ‘bloc-building’ process, in which the EU is trying to create a network 
of influence to counter that of the United States, China or other powers, and in 
which the practice of ‘competitive interdependence’ is key (Sbragia, 2010).  
It can readily be seen that these three focuses overlap, and that there are in 
effect two underlying images of the EU and its role: on the one hand, an inward-
looking EU aiming to create exclusive partnerships and to preserve its gains 
through the integration process, on the other hand an outward-looking EU placing a 
heavy emphasis on multilateralism and global governance. Both of these images 
can be supported from current EU policies, and it is clear that there is an uneven 
and fluctuating balance between them. In terms of the argument put forward in this 
article, it is also apparent that these two broad images of the EU link strongly to the 
‘three logics’ outlined earlier. On the one side, the emphasis is on the needs of the 
internal integration process (and thus the ‘internal’ logic), if necessary at the 
expense of the broader global process; on the other side, the focus is on the 
demands of life in the global arena (and thus on the ‘external’ logic) and the need 
for the EU to enter fully into processes of global governance. Both images raise 
important questions about the emerging identity of the EU, and the narratives that 
are developed to express it (and thus about the ‘identity’ logic). At this point, we 
need to move on from exploring the foundations of EU trade and commercial 
policy, and to look at the specific challenges facing the EU. 
 
THE CHANGING POSITION OF THE EU IN WORLD TRADE 
My contention is that at present the EU faces a series of major challenges 
in the global political economy, and that many of them relate directly to trade 
policy. I also suggest that these challenges place considerable pressure on the 
ability of the EU to balance the ‘three logics’ of trade and commercial policy 
outlined earlier in the article, and that this has important implications for the future 
development of EU policies. 
The first set of challenges emerges from the growth of major competitors 
in the global political economy. For much of its life, the EC and then the EU had to 
deal with only one central competitor in the world trading system: the United 
States. Since the mid-1990s, this situation has fundamentally changed, with the 
emergence of the BRICs and other large developing economies. The United States 
remains the EU’s major trading partner and competitor, but China in particular has 
become a central challenge for EU trade and commercial policy. Other challenges 
emerge from Russia, especially in the field of energy supply and energy security, 
from India and from Brazil, with South Africa and others still fully to emerge. The 
fact that the EU now exists in a multipolar global trade and commercial system 
poses a new sort of challenge, with implications both for EU policy-making and for 
the central institutions of the multilateral system, such as the WTO (Gnesotto and 
Grevi, 2006: chapter 2).  
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A second set of challenges reflects the changing nature of competitiveness 
in the global political economy. Competitiveness has been a major concern of 
EC/EU trade and commercial policy since at least the 1980s, when the Single 
Market Programme was seen as a key response to the challenge of the USA and 
Japan. The EU has had a major focus on competitiveness in the new global 
political economy of the twenty-first century, initially expressed in the Lisbon 
Programme, which was designed to make the EU the leading knowledge-based 
economy by 2010. We can see that this has not happened – indeed, there are now 
much more pervasive, and much less predictable challenges to EU competitiveness 
than existed ten years ago. The Union has recently revised and updated the Lisbon 
Programme, with rather less in the way of ambitious objectives and rather more 
attention to the production of concrete policy results. And in the field of external 
trade and commercial policy, the ‘Global Europe’ programme established within 
the past three years has produced a new drive for the conclusion of market-opening 
agreements with a series of major trading partners, as part of the revision of the 
EU’s commercial policies as a whole (European Commission, 2006). 
A third set of challenges relates to the EU’s involvement in the institutions 
of global governance. I noted earlier that one of the sources of the EU’s legitimacy 
as a trade and commercial policy actor is the ‘external’ legitimacy bestowed by 
involvement in or recognition by international institutions. This remains the case, 
but the institutional architecture of the global political economy has shifted in ways 
that challenge the EU’s status. Partly, this shift is a reflection of the rise of new 
economic powers, as noted above: the entry into the WTO of China in particular, 
and the increasing assertiveness of India and Brazil, has created a new pressure on 
the EU’s capacity to shape the agenda. Whilst Russia is not yet a member of the 
WTO, its influence in the very specific area of energy supply has clearly shaped 
perceptions of the EU’s capacity to insure itself against fluctuations or crises. The 
influence of the global economic and financial crisis has also been felt in this area 
of institutional architecture: the G7/8, in which the EU had an established role as 
part of the major industrial economies, has become markedly less prominent with 
the rise of the G20, in which not surprisingly the EU’s role has been diluted. 
Reform of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank also promises to 
reduce the centrality of the Europeans, especially when coupled with uncertainty 
about the future of the Euro-zone. 
A fourth set of challenges relates to the growth of new regional 
organisations and agreements. I noted above that the EU has set out to create inter-
regional frameworks within which it can manage its relations with a range of 
partner groupings. This in turn has created a complex web of inter-regional trade 
and commercial agreements, which have actually in some cases increased the 
problem of management, because they embody multi-level and multi-sectoral 
processes which are demanding of the EU’s resources and time (Hardacre, 2010; 
Hardacre and Smith, 2009). Alongside this web of inter-regional agreements, the 
EU has pursued an growing range of free trade agreements at the bilateral level, 
partly as a reflection of the ‘Global Europe’ programme mentioned earlier; and this 
in turn links with the pursuit of ‘competitive interdependence’ especially with the 
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USA (Sbragia, 2010). These new inter-regional organisations and agreements 
constitute a major challenge for the management of EU trade and commercial 
policy, not least because they are pursued within a multilevel process of global 
governance in which the EU is also entangled. 
Finally, as mentioned earlier, there is a broader and more diffuse set of 
challenges emerging from the new constellations of power in the global political 
economy. The EU has always (and many would say inevitably) been a champion of 
multilateralism, and this has shown itself in the pursuit of the widest possible range 
of international agreements and institutional involvement. But in 2010, 
multilateralism has to co-exist in the global arena with another important structural 
tendency: the move towards new forms of multipolarity. Whereas the pursuit of 
multilateralism implies the search for new institutional forms and new avenues for 
cooperation in pursuit of global governance, multipolarity implies something rather 
different: the search for competitive advantage and bargaining strength in a shifting 
balance of power. Whilst it would be wrong to over-emphasise this contrast, it is 
clear that the implications of multilateralism are potentially very different from 
those of multipolarity. The two are not necessarily incompatible, but in a world 
made more insecure by the impact of globalisation, they will not always sit 
comfortably together. 
Each of these sets of challenges has implications for the pursuit of EU 
trade and commercial policies. At the most general level, they imply that the EU 
has left its comfort zone – that the world of 2010 provides far less reassurance than 
the world of 2000 or 1990, and that the future is far less easy to describe. In terms 
of trade and commercial policy more strictly defined, they imply that EU policies 
are likely to become more politicised, that the threat of protectionism is likely to 
grow and that the difficulties of providing purely technocratic solutions to trade 
and commercial policy problems will also grow. I will return to these issues in the 
final section of the article. 
 
THE CURRENT TRADE AGENDA 
The current trade and commercial policy agenda for the EU is clearly 
evolving within a changed global setting. Not only that, but it is developing within 
a changed EU, given the impact of the Lisbon Treaty and other changes described 
earlier. This does not mean that long-standing problems of EU trade and 
commercial policy have disappeared – rather, that they persist but in different 
forms or with different ‘symptoms’. 
The first problem on the EU agenda is that of striking a balance between 
two contradictory aims: trade promotion and trade defence. The Lisbon Treaty, as 
with all previous treaties in the area of trade and commercial policy, commits the 
EU to the promotion of world trade, especially through the WTO. But at the same 
time, as noted earlier, there are new and pressing challenges to the EU from a 
variety of external forces. Dealing with these challenges puts the emphasis less on 
trade promotion than on trade defence: the use of trade policy instruments such as 
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anti-dumping measures or rules of origin in the effort to restrict the damage to EU 
trade interests. Trade defence also opens the door to the influence of special 
interests within the EU, especially producer interests which can use the opportunity 
to pursue their own sectional ends. A number of recent disputes, particularly those 
involving China in such areas as textiles or footwear, bear witness to this tension 
(Smith and Xie, 2009a). It is underlined by the different positions of EU Member 
States on issues of trade defence: to put it simply, there is a North-South divide in 
the EU, in which the Mediterranean members are more likely to pursue claims for 
protection than those in Northern Europe. Especially in times of economic stress 
and crisis, these tendencies are likely to be more prominent. 
Another issue on the current EU trade agenda is the impact of enlargement 
– and the prospect of enlargement. Each enlargement of the Union has created 
trade effects; both trade creation and trade diversion, which have affected not only 
the existing and new Member States but also third countries. For a long time, the 
major third-country impact was on the USA – with some additional effects on 
Australia and other agricultural producers – and primarily because of the effects of 
the extension of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). We can see now that 
more recent enlargements have demonstrated not only these effects but also effects 
on a new range of third countries, including Russia and other states of the former 
Soviet Union, and in a new range of sectors, including energy. So the impact of 
past enlargements has shifted, and has created new types of trade friction. The 
same will undoubtedly be true of future enlargements, of which the most 
substantial is clearly that potentially to Turkey. This is not the place to enter into a 
detailed analysis of the politics and economics of Turkish accession, but it is the 
place to note that this is bound to have effects on key third parties and on new 
sectors of EU trade policy. These effects are less likely to reflect trade policy 
factors in the narrow sense, and more likely to reflect the extension of the CAP and 
other EU ‘internal’ policies into new areas. 
I have already noted that the EU has spent a lot of time cultivating 
‘privileged partners’ in trade policy. The current agenda has this as a central item, 
partly because of the commitment to market access and competitiveness policies 
noted earlier. The EU is currently engaged in a wide range of free trade area 
negotiations with countries especially in Asia; it is also involved in negotiations for 
broader ‘strategic partnerships’ with the BRICs and other emerging economies 
(Grevi and de Vasconcelos, 2008; Smith and Xie, 2009b). This trend seems well 
established, and it has important implications for the way in which the EU 
approaches not only these specific negotiations but also broader talks within the 
WTO. To put it simply, there is a striking potential mismatch between the EU’s 
broad commitment to the overall multilateral system and the pursuit of privileged 
agreements with selected partners. This is not the only such case in the current 
global political economy – US policies also contain this contradiction – but it is a 
potential source of frictions between the EU and its partners in the WTO and 
elsewhere. 
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Another key item on the current agenda is the relationship between trade, 
aid and development. This is structured into the Doha Development Round of 
WTO negotiations (see below), but it also is structured into the broader range of 
EU external commercial policies. Most explicitly, it is expressed in the 
development of EU policies towards the countries of Africa, the Caribbean and the 
Pacific (ACP) within the framework of the Cotonou Convention. Here, the EU has 
promoted a multilateral cross-regional framework for its relations with the ACP 
countries, but has also increasingly pressed for the conclusion of more limited 
agreements with groups of countries through the Economic Partnership 
Agreements (EPAs) (Carbone, 2010 forthcoming). Increasingly also, the EU has 
imposed forms of economic and political conditionality on its ACP partners, with 
the aim of promoting good governance and sustainable development trajectories. 
Such strategies have important implications for the relations between the EU and 
the developing countries, but they also have an impact on the broader multilateral 
process of trade negotiations. As noted earlier, they can be seen as creating a 
‘pyramid of privilege’ and a set of relationships through which the EU acts as the 
core of a global network. One question that arises is whether this set of privileged 
relationships carries through onto the global level and affects the behaviour of ACP 
countries in the WTO; the evidence is inconclusive, but the issue will not go away. 
The final ‘agenda item’ to which I wish to draw attention is the Doha 
Development Round (DDR) itself. When this was initiated in 2001, it might have 
been predicted that the EU would play a central role in its evolution and 
conclusion; after all, during the 1990s, the Union had increasingly acted like a 
leader in global trade politics, and some Commission officials certainly felt that it 
could at least match if not surpass the influence of the USA (Smith 2004). But as 
the DDR proceeded during the early 2000s, things did not turn out as predicted. 
The EU’s vision of a wide-ranging agreement including a host of ‘new trade 
issues’ came under threat and encouraged active resistance from major developing 
countries. At the same time, although the positions of the EU and the US seemed to 
converge in some key areas (such as agriculture); it became apparent that EU-US 
agreement was no longer enough to guarantee results. Most notably, at the Cancun 
Ministerial meeting of 2003, the emergence of the Group of 20 major developing 
countries (now G22) created a serious obstacle to the kind of ‘traditional’ EU-US 
agreement that might previously have generated the momentum for a more general 
settlement. As a result, and for the past six years, there has been an effective 
stalemate in the negotiations – and this has allowed crises and tensions elsewhere 
in the global political economy (such as the current financial crisis) to impose still 
greater obstacles to an agreement. One consequence of this is the search for new 
negotiating avenues at the ‘mini-lateral’ or bilateral level that might produce more 
favourable outcomes for the EU. 
One conclusion from this brief review of the current trade policy agenda is 
that the EU, despite its acquisition of new trade policy powers and its continued 
‘weight’ in the global political economy, has never faced greater challenges to its 
status as a ‘trade superpower’. Some of these challenges come from essentially 
‘internal’ sources, with differences of view in the EU about both the direction of 
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trade policy and the broader economic orientation of the Union, which express 
themselves in apparently contradictory policy lines. Some of them emerge from 
external sources, with the challenges posed by the changing structure of world 
trade and of world trade power, and the consequent uncertainties about the EU’s 
capacity to impose its views (or even get them listened to). Others again express 
the underlying problems of values and ideas – what kind of ‘trade power’ is the EU 
to be or to become? As a result, the EU appears to many as a ‘conflicted trade 
power’ (Meunier and Nicolaidis, 2006). The problems are given added point by the 
changing nature of trade itself, and its intersection with broader commercial and 
social policy. 
 
BEYOND TRADE? THE NEW DIMENSIONS OF COMMERCIAL 
POLICY 
It has been noted for some time that trade policy ‘ain’t what it used to be’ 
(Young 2007; see also Smith, 2004; Young and Peterson, 2006). The traditional 
version of trade as trade in goods across national borders, with the consequent 
issues of tariffs and other ‘at the border’ measures of management, has not applied 
in its pure form since at least the 1970s, and it could also be argued that the growth 
of the EU is a major symptom of the changes that have taken place in recent 
decades. The linkages between trade, investment and development that 
characterised the ‘first wave’ of new trade issues, with growth of trade in services 
at its core, have been augmented by linkages between trade and a host of national 
or regional regulatory policies affecting such areas as competition, labour 
standards, environmental protection and the like. Many of these tendencies are 
expressed in a concentrated form in the development of the European Single 
Market and the EU’s relations with its major international partners and 
competitors. As a result, the EU on the one hand is partly responsible for a new 
world of commercial policy broadly defined, and on the other hand has to confront 
the new challenges this generates. 
As noted above, a key part of this new set of challenges is the rise of 
regulatory policy and ‘behind the border’ issues. The EU has played a central role 
in this process, beginning with the Single Market Programme, which had as one of 
its key aims the concentration of regulatory power in Europe as a counterweight to 
the USA and Japan (Hocking and Smith, 2007). Because of the size of the 
European market, and the desire of others for access to it, it could be used as the 
basis for a form of regulatory imperialism, in which European standards could 
conquer the world. It has not turned out precisely in that way, but there is no 
doubting the central part played by regulatory policy in the new trade politics. A 
major example is provided by competition policy, where the development of major 
new powers within the EU has created a form of regulatory competition (but also 
new forms of cooperation) with the United States (Damro, 2006a). At the broader 
multilateral level, the EU has been faced with important choices of venue – where 
exactly are regulatory agreements to be negotiated, and how are they to be applied? 
(Damro 2006b; Elsig 2007). Whilst it is clear that the ‘regulatory reach’ of the EU 
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has extended with enlargement and with the ‘capture’ of regulatory structures in 
neighbouring countries, it is far from clear that this is all to the advantage of the 
Union. 
Regulatory policy links strongly with another aspect of the new 
commercial policy: the pursuit of competitiveness. I have dealt with some aspects 
of this already, but it is important here to note that the ‘competitiveness turn’ in EU 
policy brings novel policy pressures into play. One early manifestation of this was 
to be found in the Lisbon Strategy, with the adoption of the range of monitoring 
and compliance strategies that constituted the Open Method of Coordination. More 
recently, the EU’s ‘Global Europe’ strategy has self-consciously linked national 
economic strategies with the European level and with the global level. In the 
context of the argument here, the key implication is that the EU has created new 
structures which in turn create new “management problems” spanning the internal 
and the external dimensions of policy making. This in turn has important 
repercussions on what Young has termed ‘social trade policy’ (Young, 2007). 
Linked with this is the way in which the new emphasis on competitiveness opens 
the door for the exertion of pressure by companies who feel their interests are 
threatened by unfair practices in major rivals (McGuire, 2006). 
The growing penetration of commercial policy into domestic societal 
concerns is one symptom of continuing globalisation – one of the effects of which 
is to reduce perceptions of ‘societal security’ and to increase the politicisation of 
what were previously largely technocratic policy processes. If we accept that one 
of the key elements of EU commercial policy is the management of globalisation 
(Jacoby and Meunier, 2010), then a central component of such management has to 
be the management of social consensus (or social conflict). As Young points out, 
such management is far removed from the traditional concept of trade policy as the 
management of exchange across national borders, and it brings into play major new 
forces of resistance to major shifts in the global arena. Thus whilst the EU might be 
able to act relatively autonomously at the European level in areas of ‘traditional’ 
trade policy, it is far less likely to be able to do so in ‘social trade policy’ (Young, 
2007). 
This problem presents itself in a highly concentrated form in circumstances 
of crisis. Therefore it is not unexpected that in the current financial and economic 
crisis, the EU has found it very difficult to project a consistent or consistently 
positive approach to trade policy in all of its new variants. Whilst it has pursued 
relatively traditional market-opening aims in the context of both multilateral and 
bilateral trade agreements, it has also put a heavy emphasis on the opening up of 
regulatory and other structures in such areas as investment and competition policy, 
whilst at the same time promoting a set of values that has introduced ‘social trade’ 
features in areas such as human rights and environmental sustainability. In doing 
so, it has had to balance precariously between the resistance of external partners 
(especially countries such as China and India) and the need to preserve social 
consensus within the EU. Trade politics is not only ‘not what it used to be’ – it is 
much more politically challenging and uncomfortable. 
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Because of the increasing and often contradictory pressures created by the 
new politics of commercial policy and ‘social trade policy’, the EU’s contribution 
to global governance in the area of trade and related policies is increasingly open to 
question. Once seen as the ‘compulsive multilateralist’ and willing to sign up for a 
very wide range of global governance initiatives (not least in order to establish the 
legitimacy of collective action at the European level), the EU is now less ready and 
less willing to do so. The most dramatic expressions of this problem have come in 
the field of financial governance, where the disunity of European responses to the 
current crisis has been striking at various stages (and where the internal financial 
crisis of the Euro-zone has only added to the sense of uncertainty). More broadly, 
however, the EU has become less enthusiastic about multilateralism for its own 
sake, and more disposed to adopt ‘mini-lateral’ or bilateral solutions to its 
problems in trade and commercial policy. The irony of this is that at precisely the 
time when the EU’s internal commercial policy framework seems more coherent 
and integrated than ever before and thus a strong basis for involvement in global 
governance activities the fragmentation of the policy environment and the rise of 
new power constellations has thrown its potential effectiveness open to question. 
 
CONCLUSION: ISSUES FOR THE FUTURE 
At the beginning of this article, I noted that the EU’s trade policy is in 
transition. I also noted that the results of this transition would depend upon the 
interaction between three logics of EU policy-making: the ‘internal’ logic of 
integration, the ‘external’ logic reflecting the opportunity structure in the global 
arena, and the ‘identity’ logic expressing the search for a European voice and status 
in the global political economy. My argument was that if all three of these logics 
were ‘positive’, then the prospects for EU trade policy would be good; if they were 
‘negative’, then the prospects would be bad; and that most likely, there would be a 
mixture of positive and negative signs leading to advances in some areas but 
setbacks in others. 
What issues will be central to the future development of EU trade policy? 
The first concerns the policy framework. The EU possesses strong institutional and 
resource foundations for continued influence in and through trade policy, but 
changes in the policy context create challenges that will be difficult to overcome. 
The impact of the Lisbon Treaty is positive in institutional terms, but there will be 
problems in coordinating trade policy with other areas of EU external policy, 
particularly foreign and security policy, and in locating trade diplomacy within a 
broader EU system of diplomacy centred on the European External Action Service. 
A second and related issue concerns the EU’s capacity to coordinate 
commercial diplomacy in an era when the ‘new agendas’ of commercial policy and 
social trade policy are likely to become increasingly prominent. Not only this but 
also the increasing interactions between trade policy and development policy, and 
between trade policy and financial policy will be central to the coming period. 
Trade policy will inevitably become more politicised if not securitised, and the 
The European Union As…                                     DEÜ SBE Dergisi, Cilt:12, Sayı:2 
103 
 
political management of trade policy will become an increasingly pressing concern 
for the Commission and other EU bodies. 
A third issue, well signalled in this article, will be the continuing changes 
to global power constellations, not only in the global political economy but also in 
the politics of foreign policy and security policy. The EU has advanced into these 
areas partly on the basis of its success as an actor in the global political economy, 
but in doing so it has entered much more risky and uncertain territory, where its 
status as a ‘power’ is more open to question. It is not inconceivable that a process 
of ‘blowback’ from involvement in the politics of security and defence, as well as 
the increasingly fragile nature of the global political economy itself, will create 
problems with the continuing development of EU trade policy. 
A fourth issue surrounds the extent to which the EU can sustain a coherent 
vision of its involvement in the global political economy, as the basis for consistent 
and effective trade policy. I have argued that this kind of vision, and the values on 
which it is based, has become increasingly open to question as the internal 
contradictions of EU trade policy have become apparent. These internal 
contradictions, when combined with the fragmentation of global economic power 
structures, and challenges to key institutions, already threaten the idea of a 
consistent EU vision, and there will be a need for strong and positive action to 
preserve it. 
A fifth issue centres on the dangers posed by uneven performance within 
the EU itself. In the case of economic performance, this danger is particularly 
apparent at the moment (in early Summer 2010). The increasing economic 
divergence within the Euro-zone, not to mention the dangers of economic collapse 
in certain Member States, has thrown into question the institutional and political 
basis for developments in external policies broadly defined and in trade policy 
more specifically. It is encouraging; however, that what appears to be a multilateral 
and multi-institutional response to these challenges has emerged – although it is far 
too early to conclude that it is a solution. 
A final issue relates to the ways in which trade policy may reflect the 
impact of further EU enlargement – and specifically enlargement to include 
Turkey. The picture I have painted is not one in which self-confidence and 
expansiveness are likely to characterise EU trade policy in the near future. But as 
noted earlier, my view is that trade policy traditionally defined is less likely to be a 
source of tensions than major areas of ‘domestic’ EU policy such as the CAP. The 
impact of such developments on third countries, in the neighbourhood and 
elsewhere, is likely to be accompanied by tensions in the new areas of commercial 
policy and social trade policy of the kinds noted earlier in the article. 
In all of these areas, the challenges will reflect the interaction of the ‘three 
logics’ identified in this article. On the face of it, these logics are predominantly if 
not entirely negative in mid-2010: internal integration has taken some steps 
forward but is faced with major challenges in the financial sphere, the external 
opportunity structure is challenging and may deny the EU the policy space within 
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which to develop its role, and the identity logic seems to reflect normative 
confusion about what the EU is for in the global arena. In such circumstances, it is 
very difficult to identify major opportunities and all too easy to see the challenges 
confronting the Union. But these are not just challenges to the EU and therein 
perhaps lay the key opportunity: the circumstances demand a major effort at 
multilateral management, combining the resources of a range of institutions, which 
would bolster the EU’s capacity to participate in if not to lead the management of 
the global political economy. Whether this will be the outcome is beyond my 
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